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Abstract 
This thesis evaluates the profitability of technical trading rules in emerging 
currency markets. Following the approach of Okunev and White (2003), we have 
examined 354 long/short moving average rules across six emerging currencies. It is 
found that investing in emerging currencies can generate an average monthly return 
of about 3%, which is much higher than the returns found in Okunev and White 
(2003) for major currencies. The trading rules profits are relatively stable across the 
20-year sample period and do not demonstrate a trend of diminishment over time. 
Furthermore, we have also studied the impact of financial crises on the trading rules 
returns. It is shown that the profitability of the trading rules is improved by the crises. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The effectiveness of trading rules in the foreign exchange market has been 
well-documented in recent decades. Sweeney (1986) reveals that during the period 
from 1975 to 1980, filter rules profits exist in the currency market. Neely et al. (1997) 
illustrate that momentum tactics achieve significant excess returns from 1981 to 1995. 
Okunev and White (2003) find that the success of the technical analysis continues 
during the 1990s. These studies challenge the efficient market hypothesis, which 
asserts that technical strategies cannot create positive risk-adjusted profits. 
Several justifications have been proposed to explain the success of trading rules 
in the currency markets. One of the most widely examined explanations is that 
central bank intervention prevents the foreign exchange markets from being efficient. 
The rationale behind this hypothesis is that the motive for monetary authorities to 
trade is to stabilize the exchange rate rather than to make profits. Central bank 
interventions distort the random-walk movements of currency prices and thus it may 
be a source of inefficiency (Szakmary and Mathur, 1997). Research generally reports 
mixed results in this aspect. LeBaron (1999) demonstrates a strong correlation 
between the returns from moving average strategies and the interventions by the 
Federal Reserve. On the other hand, Neely (2002) finds that intervening activities do 
not produce trading rules profits. 
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Most of the existing studies in the literature, however, focus on the currencies of 
developed countries. The profitability of technical trading rules on the currencies of 
emerging economies is surprisingly understudied. Martin (2001) contributes to this 
area by examining the daily spot exchange rates of 12 emerging currencies against 
the US dollar over the period from January 1992 to June 1995. Her study illustrates 
that although profits exist for the moving average techniques, the risk-adjusted 
returns of these rules, as evaluated by the Sharpe ratio, are not higher than those 
generated by the short selling tactic and the risk-free strategy'. 
Ahmed et al. (2005) investigated the daily spot exchange rates of Chile, Mexico, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand from January 1990 to 
November 2000. They demonstrate that four of the moving average rules are 
successful when compared with the buy-and-hold strategy. 
Okunev and White (2003) study the effectiveness of momentum strategies for 
the currencies of developed economies. The main advantage of their methodology, 
when compared with that of Martin (2001) and Ahmed et al. (2005), is that the 
results produced will be insensitive to the choice of the trading rules and the base 
currency. In addition, by evaluating 354 moving average tactics, the problem of 
data-snooping can be alleviated. This thesis works along the line of Okunev and 
1 However, the sample period of her study is rather short, so her findings should be interpreted with 
caution, 
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White (2003). We examine the profitability of technical trading rules in six emerging 
currencies, including the Mexican Peso, the Philippine Peso, the Thai Baht, the South 
Korean Won, the Sri Lankan Rupee and the South African Rand. The remainder of 
this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set and discusses the 
research methodology. Section 3 reports the empirical results. Section 4 concludes 
the thesis. 
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Chapter 2. Data and Methodology 
In our study, end-of-month data of spot exchange rates and money market rates: 
are obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS). We studied the 
exchange rates of Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, 
and Thailand^ over the period from January 1980 to December 2004. The exchange 
rates of the six currencies are plotted in Figures 1 to 6. We observe that all of the six 
emerging currencies have suffered depreciation against the US dollar over the past 
20 years. 
[Insert Figures 1 to 6 about here] 
Following Okunev and White (2003), we calculate currency returns one by one 
using each currency as the base currency. From month t - 1 to t, the base currency 
returns are defined as 
2 Descriptors of money market rates by the IFS are typically overnight inter-bank call rates or the 
equivalent. 
3 An obstacle to this research is that it is difficult for us to find suitable emerging currencies to 
examine. As of June 2006 the MSCI Emerging Markets Index consisted of the following 25 emerging 
market countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, 
Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. However, some of them did peg their 
exchange rates in sometime between January 1985 and December 2004, some of them did not have 
full 25-year data of both the exchange rates and the interest rates. Therefore, we chose 5 out of the 
above 25 countries: Mexico, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand and South Africa to study. In 
addition, we also study one more emerging currency, the Sri Lankan Rupee. 
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…-丨 (1) 
where Rb, t is the base currency return, St is the spot exchange rate at month t, and St-
1 is the spot exchange rate at month t - 1. Exchange rates are expressed as direct 
quote, that is, the ratio of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. 
In addition, we also compute the return series after adjusting for the interest rate 
differentials between foreign and domestic currencies. Denoting as the futures 
price at month t - 1. From month t - 1 io t, the interest-adjusted currency returns are 
defined as 
/? - i — i 
- J 7 ’ 
'-1 (2) 
where 尺/,, is the interest-adjusted currency return, F t - j = St - i exp [ ( r - r/) * (1 / 12)], 
r is the interest rate of domestic currency, and r , is the interest rate of foreign 
currency. Note that 
… _ i (3) 
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Equation (3) decomposes the realized returns from investing in a currency into 
two parts. The return due to interest rate differential is 
12 (4) 
and the return from mere currency appreciation is 
i - L 
(5) 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the base currency returns for each 
country. Each base currency is indicated in the first column and the reference 
currencies are in the succeeding columns. For instance, taking the Mexican Peso as 
the domestic currency, the monthly appreciation of the Philippine Peso is 1.410 % on 
average. The Equal-weighted benchmark assigns the same weight to the other five 
non-domestic currencies when assessing the returns relative to each base currency. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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From Table 1, we observe that the South Korean Won and the Thai Baht 
actually have experienced a significant appreciation with respect to other emerging 
currencies in the last two decades. Conversely, the Mexican Peso has incurred the 
greatest depreciation with respect to other currencies, with all the mean returns being 
significant at the 1% level. 
The actual returns to the traders in the foreign exchange market are the 
interest-adjusted currency returns. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of this 
return series. Recall that the returns of trading in a currency are composed of the pure 
currency appreciation and the interest rate differential. When we examine the 
interest-adjusted performance, the ranking of the currencies is dramatically different 
from that of Table 1. Considering the base currency returns, the Mexican Peso is the 
worst; while considering the interest-adjusted currency returns, the Mexican Peso is 
the best. The Thai Baht, which has an outstanding performance when we just 
evaluate the pure appreciation effect, becomes the least-profitable currency when the 
interest differentials are taken into account. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Following the methodology of Okunev and White (2003), we study the 
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profitability of the moving average rules. First, we use the base currency returns to 
calculate a short-run and a long-run moving average for each non-domestic currency 
against the base currency. Then, we rank the five non-domestic currencies by 
evaluating the moving average difference. This difference is computed by subtracting 
the long-run moving average from the short-run moving average. A portfolio will 
then be formed by holding a long position for the highest rank currency and a short 
position for the lowest rank currency. 
Define the moving average rules as follows. Short-run moving average at month 
t is formulated as 
沾"二 ； ’ 
J (6) 
where SRj,/ is the short-run moving average at month t using the returns of the 
previous j months. The long-run moving average at month t is formulated as 
/?,’,+(/:-料.’卜 1 
LK"= ： ， 
k (7) 
where LRk ,t is the long-run moving average at month t using the returns of the 
previous k months. 
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In this thesis, a short-run moving average refers to one with a duration of one to 
12 months, whereas a long-run moving average refers to one with a duration of two 
to 36 months. Instead of just focusing on some specific moving average rules, each 
moving average difference will contribute one portfolio, and we will have 354 
equally weighted portfolios in total. For instance, when we determine currency 
allocation using the six-month short-run moving average, moving average portfolios 
will include SRs,, - LR?’,, SR6, t - LRs,,’ ...，SRe, t - LR36,For each portfolio, 
long/short positions will be held for one month. At the end of each month, the 
ranking of each of the 354 portfolios will be reexamined, and new positions will be 
taken if necessary. 
In the work of Okunev and White (2003), two strategies are used. The first 
strategy is investing in currency with the highest rank and shorting the currency with 
the lowest rank. Another strategy is to allocate money equally to long the top three. 
In our study, on top of these two strategies, we also invest equally in the top two 
ranks and short the lowest. We summarize these strategies in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
As mentioned above, base currency returns are utilized to determine the 
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short-run/long-run moving average ranks. However, the actual return to an investor is 
the interest-adjusted currency returns. Thus, we will evaluate the profitability of the 
trading strategies using interest-adjusted currency returns. 
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Chapter 3. Results 
3.1 Performance of Long/Short Strategies 
In this thesis, we examine the performance of these three strategies from 
January 1985 to December 2004. Tables 4a, b and c summarize the performance of 
the three strategies. We find that they are well-performed during the entire sample 
period, regardless of the base currency of reference. For all the base currencies and 
all the three strategies, the mean monthly returns are significant at the 1% level. 
[Insert Table 4a about here] 
[Insert Table 4b about here] 
[Insert Table 4c about here] 
We observe that strategy one outperforms the other two strategies and strategy 
three is the least profitable tactic. For strategy one, the monthly mean returns of the 
six base currencies range from 2.9% to 3.9% per month. The monthly mean returns 
of strategy two range from 2.5% to 3.2%. For strategy three, the results range 
between 2.2% and 2.8%. In addition, we note that across the three strategies, using 
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the Sri Lankan Rupee as the base currency of reference generates the greatest trading 
rules returns. If we use the South African Rand as the base currency, trading rules 
profits are the least. 
The information ratio is the mean return divided by the standard deviation. It is 
a measure of the level of risk. A higher information ratio represents a better 
risk-adjusted performance. We can observe that for all of the base currencies of 
reference, the information ratio of strategy one is the highest and that of strategy 
three is the lowest. Thus, when we assess the relative performance among the three 
strategies by means of the information ratio*, strategy one remains the best tactic 
while strategy three is still the worst. Next we will examine whether these three 
strategies can generate excess returns. According to Okunev and White (2003), there 
is no consensus on the appropriate benchmark for comparisons. If international 
foreign exchange markets are efficient, then the currency prices are random walks, 
hence a zero expected return should be a proper benchmark. In addition, a portfolio 
that equally weights currency exposure should also be an appropriate benchmark. We 
calculate these equal-weighted portfolios using the interest-adjusted currency returns 
illustrated in Table 2. The excess returns for the three strategies are illustrated in 
4 Following Okunev and White (2003), we use the information ratio to compare the relative risk 
rather than the Sharpe ratio as there is no consensus on the appropriate risk-free rate for a zero 
expected return strategy in the foreign exchange market. 
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Tables 4a, b and c. 
For all of the three strategies, in about 85% of the 240 months the moving 
average rules can yield positive returns for all the base currencies. During the entire 
sample period, the probability that the trading rules profits are greater than the 
Equal-weighted benchmark is about 80% for strategy one, and it is about 75% for 
strategies two and three. The paired t-test measures the significance of returns 
generated by the long/short moving average tactics in excess of the Equal-weighted 
benchmark. The results from the paired t-test illustrate that, for all the base 
currencies and all the three strategies, the moving average trading rules are capable 
of generating excess returns that are significant at the 1% level. 
As mentioned above, each strategy consists of 354 different and equally 
weighted moving average portfolios. We find that across the three strategies, all of 
the 354 moving average rules outperformed the zero benchmark as well as the 
Equal-weighted benchmark on average, regardless of the choice of the base currency. 
Thus, the exact choice of the moving average rule is irrelevant. 
To examine whether the trading rules profits of the emerging currencies 
presented here are just simply taking advantage of the forward premium anomaly^ 
5 According to the interest rate parity, if a currency has a positive interest rate differential against 
another currency, the former is expected to depreciate against the latter. However, it is common to 
observe the forward premium anomaly, where high interest rate currencies tend to appreciate against 
those with relatively lower interest rate. 
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one may examine the portion of profits that are due to interest rate differentials. A 
positive interest rate differential implies that the moving average portfolios are 
inclined to long high interest rate currencies and/or short low interest rate currencies. 
From Tables 4a, b and c, it is evident that for all the six base currencies of 
reference and across the three strategies, the interest rate differentials are negative. 
Thus, the trading rules profits are not simply exploiting the forward premium 
anomaly. Rather, the returns are contributed purely by the movements in exchange 
rates. It should be noted that interest rate differentials for emerging currencies are 
bigger than those of major currencies. Okunev and White (2003) report that interest 
rate differentials of the developed currencies are at most 11 basis points per month. 
For the strategies presented here, the average interest rate differentials of the six base 
currencies are 22, 43 and 52 basis points each month for strategy one, two and three 
respectively. 
We rank the five non-domestic currencies by the moving average difference. 
Portfolios will then be formed by holding a long position for the highest ranked 
currency and a short position for the lowest ranked currency. Combining all of the 
354 moving average portfolios constructed by this approach, we form the three 
momentum strategies. Nevertheless, the currency that ranks first based on the 
moving average difference of the base currency returns does not necessarily have the 
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highest actual return. The actual return realized depends upon the interest rate 
differentials. Consequently, we inspect the individual rank returns. 
Note from Table 5 that, the average performance decreases with the rank of the 
currency. All the rank-1 currencies have positive mean returns between 1.3% and 
2.2% each month and are significant at the 1% level. The returns for the rank-2 
currencies range from 0.2% to 1% only. The profits are the lowest for the rank-5 
currencies. All the rank-5 currencies have significantly negative mean returns 
between -1 .3% and -2 .2% per month. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
In conclusion, during the whole sample period of January 1985 to December 
2004, investing in emerging currencies using the moving average strategies of 
Okunev and White (2003) can generate a return of about 3% per month on average. 
This 3% return is higher than the zero-return and the Equal-weighted benchmarks. 
Okunev and White (2003) discovers that the resulting mean monthly returns 
range from 45 to 60 basis points each month for the currencies of the developed 
economies. It is a common belief that emerging markets are less efficient when 
compared with the developed markets. Thus, technical analysis is expected to 
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generate a higher return in emerging markets than developed markets. Compared 
with the results of Okunev and White (2003), our findings support this conjecture� . 
6 Although our results show a return of about 3% per month, which is much greater than the return 
figure in Okunev and White (2003)，there are some factors that may eliminate our trading rules profits. 
For example, the spread of emerging currencies may be very large. The turnover may be so thin that 
we may not be able to long and short the amount that we desire. The number of middlemen engaging 
in the trading of emerging currencies may also be very limited so that a higher transaction cost will be 
needed. 
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3.2 Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis 
Olson (2004) argues that the market has corrected its inefficiency over time. To 
examine the stability of the trading rules profits, we conduct a subsample analysis. 
The subsample analysis of strategies one, two and three are illustrated in Tables 6a, b 
and c respectively, in the rows with the short-run moving average range from 1 to 12. 
[Insert Table 6a about here] 
[Insert Table 6b about here] 
[Insert Table 6c about here] 
The whole sample period is f rom January 1985 to December 2004. Following 
Okunev and White (2003), we divide the entire 20 years into four five-year 
subsamples. The four subsample periods are 1985 to 1989，1990 to 1994，1995 to 
1999 and 2000 to 2004. For all the base currencies and all the three strategies, the 
trading rules profits are positive and still significant at the 1% level across the four 
subsamples. The returns from the moving average tactics are higher than the 
Equal-weighted benchmark for all the corresponding subsamples as well. 
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Observe that the strategies perform the best in the third subsample. For strategy 
one, the monthly mean returns of the six base currencies in this subsample range 
from 3.8% to 4.7%, which dominate the whole sample returns of 2.9% to 3.9%. The 
subsample monthly returns for strategy two range f rom 3.3% to 4.1%，while those of 
the entire period are between 2.5% and 3.2% only. Even for the least profitable tactic, 
strategy three, the subsample monthly returns range between 2.9% and 3.7%, which 
dominate the whole sample returns of 2.2% to 2.8%. 
In sum, in the subsample 1995 to 1999, the monthly trading rules returns are the 
greatest and about 0.8% higher than the whole sample-period averages. Moreover, 
we recognize that the performance of the moving average strategies between 2000 
and 2004 is better than that of the subsample 1985 to 1989. The results f rom 1990 to 
1994 are the worst among the four subsamples. Okunev and White (2003) show that 
the trading strategies perform the worst between 1990 and 1994 as well. Our results 
are similar. 
Nevertheless, even the returns are the lowest during 1990 to 1994, the average 
monthly returns of all the six base currencies of reference are still over 2% in most 
cases. More importantly, our results do not demonstrate a trend of diminishing 
trading rules profits over time. This does not support the argument of Olson (2004) 
that the market has corrected its inefficiency. At the very least, our results illustrate 
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that emerging currencies markets are still not efficient at all. 
Following Okunev and White (2003), we also study the profitability of our 
strategies on the combinations which use only a subset of the short run moving 
averages. The results are reported in Tables 6a, b and c. 
For instance, the row (4-6) indicates that we only use the short-run moving 
average with the window size from 4 to 6 months to compute the trading rules profits. 
In this case, the moving average portfolios will include SR4,, - LR5,,, SR4, t - LR^, t,…， 
SR4. , - LR36,SR5, t - LR6, t, SRs, t - LRj,,’ …，SRs, t - LR36, t and SRe,, - LR7,,，肌,,-
LRs, t, ... , SRs, t - LR36, f In total, there will be 93 equally weighted moving average 
combinations. 
The strategies based on these four groups of short-run moving average can still 
generate positive trading rules returns and outperform the Equal-weighted 
benchmark. Note that the first group with a 1- to 3-month window size generates the 
highest trading rules profits. For the whole sample period (1985-2004), applying 
strategy one on the 93 combinations, the monthly mean returns of the six base 
currencies range from 4.1% to 5.4%, which are much higher than returns of 2.9% to 
3.9% from the same strategy using the 354 combinations. For strategy two, the 
corresponding figures are 3.4% to 4.5% and 2.5% and 3.2%. For strategy three, using 
the short-run window size of 1 to 3 months only can improve the resulting profits 
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from the range of 2.2% - 2.8% to 3.0% - 3.9%. 
In general, for the first subgroup, the monthly trading rules returns are the 
highest. All the long/short strategies returns in the first and the second subgroups are 
statistical significant at the 1% level. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the returns for 
the second subgroup is smaller. Profits for the third subgroup are even smaller when 
compared to the second subgroup. The returns of the last subgroup are the lowest, 
with some of the returns being insignificant. 
One important note is that even for the window size of 10 to 12 months, the 
profits are still positive and higher than the Equal-weighted benchmark. We may 
conclude that the results are insensitive to the moving average strategies employed. 
To further investigate the sensitivity of the trading rules profits presented here, 
we examine two more event-based subsample analyses. The first one is the Mexican 
Peso Crisis, which occurred in December 1994. The crisis was triggered by the 
sudden devaluation of the Mexican Peso. Fear swept throughout the South American 
region, which caused many currencies in the Southern Cone to plunge sharply. This 
contagion is well-known as "Tequila Effect". 
In our analysis, we would like to see whether there is a disparity in the trading 
rules profits before and after the outbreak of the crisis. We define December 1989 to 
November 1994, that is, 5 year before the Mexican Peso Crisis as the first subsample, 
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while the second subsample is from December 1994 to November 1999. We compare 
the results of these two subsamples with those of the entire sample period. The 
results are shown in Tables 7a, b and c. 
[Insert Table 7a about here] 
[Insert Table 7b about here] 
[Insert Table 7c about here] 
We observe that since the crisis outbreak, the profits from the long/short moving 
average strategy are greater than those of the pre-crisis subsample. For strategy one, 
before the crisis, the mean monthly returns of the six base currencies range from 
1.6% to 2.4%. After the crisis, the profits rise to a higher range of 4.0% to 5.3% in 
the second subsample. This phenomenon is common for the second and the third 
strategies. Essentially, before and after the crisis, the difference in the trading rules 
profits is large, with an average magnitude of about 2.3% per month. 
One more interesting point to note is that, despite the fact that the Mexican Peso 
has slumped dramatically since the crisis, the trading rules profits remain positive 
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and significant at the 1% level when the Mexican Peso is used as the base currency. 
The mean monthly returns when using the Mexican Peso as the base are 4.0%, 3.6% 
and 3.3% for strategy one, two and three respectively. 
Next, we examine the effect of the Asian Financial Crisis on the trading rules 
performance. The crisis was triggered by the devaluation of the Thai Baht in July 
1997. Again, we would like to see if there are disparities in trading rules performance 
before and after the Crisis. By a similar analysis, we define July 1992 to June 1997， 
that is, 5 year before the Asian Financial Crisis as the first subsample, while July 
1997 to June 2002 is the second subsample. We compare the results of these two 
subsamples with those of the entire sample period. The results are shown in Tables 
8a, b and c. 
[Insert Table 8a about here] 
[Insert Table 8b about here] 
[Insert Table 8c about here] 
We find that the post-Asian-Financial-Crisis returns are greater than the 
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pre-crisis returns. These findings are similar to those of the Mexican Peso Crisis. 
Before the crisis outbreak, for strategy one, the mean monthly returns of the six base 
currencies are 1.9% - 3.1% in this subsample. After the crisis, for strategy one, the 
profits surge to 5.0% - 5.8%. Strategies two and three also give similar results. 
Overall, before and after the crisis, the difference in trading rules profits is enormous, 
with an average magnitude of about 2.4% per month. 
Among the six currencies under study, three of them are Asian currencies, 
including the Philippine Peso, the South Korean Won and the Thai Baht. These three 
currencies were seriously hit by the crisis. Nonetheless, since the crisis, the trading 
rules profits remain positive and significant at the 1 % level when taking these three 
injured currencies as base currencies. The mean monthly returns are 5.1% to 5.7% 
for strategy one, 4.6% to 5.0% for strategy two, and 4.1% to 4.5% for strategy three 
when using these three Asian currencies as the base. 
In addition, we conduct a control test that only the three Asian currencies, the 
Philippine Peso, the Thai Baht and the South Korean Won, are included to examine 
the sensitivity of the trading rules. The strategy of the control test is to long the 
rank-1 non-domestic currency and short the rank-2 non-domestic currency for each 
base currency. The results are illustrated in Table 9. 
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[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Though it is not directly comparable, we notice that forming a portfolio 
consisting of the three Asian currencies generates a smaller trading rules return of 
about 1.3% each month during the entire sample period. Recall that the original 
moving average rules, which consist of six countries in different regions, yield a 
return of about 3% per month on average. 
Moreover, using a similar approach, we may conduct subsample analysis to 
inspect the impacts of the Asian Financial Crisis on the trading rules performance in 
a portfolio with the three Asian currencies only. We find that in the five-year 
pre-crisis subsample, the mean monthly profits from moving average rules only 
range from 0.4% to 1.0% for the three base currencies. After the crisis, the returns 
rise to 1.9% to 3.1% monthly on average. In conclusion, the outbreak of financial 
crises increases the performance of the trading rules. 
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3.3 Autocorrelation Analysis 
The existence of autocorrelation in returns may provide opportunities for the 
existence trading-rule profits. Therefore, it will be of interest to inspect the 
autocorrelation structure of the currency returns. 
Tables 10a, b and c illustrate the autocorrelations of the monthly returns and the 
squared monthly returns of the long/short moving average strategies. We discover 
that four of the six base currencies of reference, including the Mexican Peso, the 
Philippine Peso, the South African Rand and the Sri Lankan Rupee do show various 
degrees of autocorrelations in currency returns during the sample period. 
[Insert Table 10a about here] 
[Insert Table 10b about here] 
[Insert Table 10c about here] 
For strategy one, using the Mexican Peso as the base, the monthly returns have 
significantly positive first, third, fifth, sixth and the seventh order serial correlations. 
Its squared monthly returns also exhibit significantly positive autocorrelations of the 
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first, second, fifth, sixth and the seventh order. In most cases, we have significantly 
positive autocorrelations in the first, fifth, sixth and the seventh lags. In addition, the 
squared monthly returns also illustrate positive first and the fifth order serial 
correlations. The results suggest that, for these emerging currencies, the returns are 
not totally random. 
For strategy two, only the first, fifth and the sixth lags of the monthly returns 
and the fifth lag of the squared monthly returns of the majority of base currencies 
demonstrate positive autocorrelations. For strategy three, only the first and the fifth 
lags of the monthly returns are positively serially correlated for the majority of 
currencies. 
Recall that strategy one outperforms strategy two, and strategy three performs 
the worst. Thus, from Tables 10a to 10c, the returns to the strategies might be due to 
the correlation structure of the interest-adjusted return series. 
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Chapter 4. Discussion and Conclusion 
A good number of studies have documented the performance of technical trading 
rules in the foreign exchange market. However, most of the studies in the literature 
focus on the currencies of the developed countries, and the profitability of technical 
trading rules in emerging currency markets is surprisingly understudied. This thesis 
employs the approach of Okunev and White (2003) to evaluate the profitability of 
technical trading rules in emerging currencies. We examine the currencies of six 
developing economies, including the Mexican Peso, the Philippine Peso, the Thai 
Baht, the South Korean Won, the Sri Lankan Rupee and the South African Rand. 
The results in this thesis demonstrate that, during the entire sample period of 
January 1985 to December 2004, investing in emerging currencies using the 
short-run/long-run moving average strategies shown here can generate an average 
monthly return of about 3%, which is significantly higher than the zero-return and 
the equal-weighted benchmarks. Moreover, the returns of our trading strategies are 
relatively stable across the subsamples and do not diminish over time. Our findings 
are against the efficient market hypothesis. 
Last but not least, we also find that the occurrences of financial crises improve 
the trading rules performance. This may be due to the increased volatility of the 
exchange rates after the crises, but a detailed investigation is needed in the future. 
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Appendix 
A. 1 Exchange Rates Figures 
Figure 1 
Mexico / US Foreign Exchange Rate (Mexican Peso to One US Dollar) 
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Figure 2 
Philippines / US Foreign Exchange Rate (Philippine Peso to One US Dollar) 
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Figure 3 
South Africa / US Foreign Exchange Rate (S. African Rand to One US Dollar) 
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Figure 4 
South Korea / US Foreign Exchange Rate (S. Korean Won to One US Dollar) 
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Figure 5 
Sri Lanka / US Foreign Exchange Rate (Sri Lankan Rupee to One US Dollar) 
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Figure 6 
Thailand / US Foreign Exchange Rate (Thai Baht to One US Dollar) 
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Source: International Financial Statistics 
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Figure 7 
Performance Comparison of the Six Emerging Currencies against the US Dollar 
(In Log Scale) 
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Remark: The higher the exchange rate against the US dollar, the poorer the 
performance of the currency. 
Source: International Financial Statistics 
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A 2 Tables 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics (Base Currency Returns) 
Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand Equal 
Mexico 
Mean Ret. (%) NA 1.410** 1.476** 1.788** 1.244** 1.726** 1.528** 
Median Ret. (%) NA 0.548 0.555 0.818 0.193 0.656 0.660 
Std. Dev. (%) NA 5.648 6.785 6.136 5.233 6.204 5.429 
f-Stat. NA 3.866 3.370 4.513 3.681 4.310 4.362 
Infor. Ratio NA 0.250 0.218 0.291 0.238 0.278 0.282 
Philippines 
Mean Ret. (%) -1.121** NA 0.133 0.416 -0.094 0.326 -0.068 
Median Ret. (%) -0.545 NA -0.111 0.320 -0.290 0.139 -0.344 
Std. Dev. (%) 4.946 NA 5.172 3.802 3.056 2.934 2.758 
r-Stat. —3.510 NA 0.397 1.695 -0.476 1.723 -0.382 
Infor. Ratio -0.227 NA 0.026 0.109 -0.031 0.111 -0.025 
South Africa 
Mean Ret. (%) -1.062** 0.128 NA 0.485 -0.046 0.406 -0.018 
Median Ret. (%) -0.552 0.111 NA 0.189 —0.188 0.276 -0.079 
Std. Dev. (%) 5.997 5.119 NA 5.334 4.434 5.049 4.512 
/-Stat. -2.745 0.388 NA 1.409 -0.160 1.246 -0.061 
Infor. Ratio -0.177 0.025 NA 0.091 -0.010 0.080 -0.004 
South Korea 
Mean Ret. (%) -1.424** -0.268 —0.193 NA -0.409 0.023 -0.454 
Median Ret. (%) —0.811 -0.319 -0.189 NA -0.414 -0.060 -0.496 
Std. Dev. (%) 5.761 3.910 5.585 NA 4.037 4.159 3.784 
r-Stat. -3.829 —1.062 -0.535 NA -1.569 0.086 -1.859 
Infor. Ratio -0.247 -0.069 -0.035 NA -0.101 0.006 -0.120 
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Table 1 一 continued 
Descriptive Statistics (Base Currency Returns) 
Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand Equal 
Sri Lanka 
Mean Ret. (%) -1.009** 0.184 0.235 0.549* NA 0.480* 0.088 
Median Ret. (%) —0.193 0.291 0.188 0.416 NA 0.405 0.106 
Std. Dev. (%) 4.335 2.979 4.315 3.513 NA 3.358 2.167 
f-Stat. -3.606 0.959 0.844 2.423 NA 2.215 0.629 
Infor. Ratio -0.233 0.062 0.054 0.156 NA 0.143 0.041 
Thailand 
Mean Ret. (%) -1.377** -0.244 -0.162 0.137 -0.368 NA -0.403* 
Median Ret. (%) -0.652 -0.139 -0.275 0.060 -0.403 NA -0.497 
Std. Dev. (%) 5.393 2.805 4.886 3.950 3.334 NA 2.970 
厂 Stat. -3.955 -1.347 -0.515 0.536 -1.712 NA -2.102 
Infor. Ratio -0.255 -0.087 -0.033 0.035 -0.110 NA -0.136 
This table exhibits the monthly returns statistics of individual currencies over the period 
January 1985 to December 2004. Coverage of this period is 240 months. Each base currency 
is indicated on the first column and the succeeding columns give the return statistics of the 
five non-domestic currencies relative to the base currency. The Equal column computes 
currency returns by assuming same weight is allocated to each of the five non-domestic 
currencies. The information ratio is the mean return divided by the standard deviation. ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics (Interest-Adjusted Currency Returns) 
Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand Equal 
Mexico 
Mean Ret. (%) NA -0.418 -0.294 -0.253 -0.048 -0.528 -0.308 
Median Ret. (%) NA -0.729 -0.798 -0.651 -0.295 -0.847 -0.763 
Std. Dev. (%) NA 5.433 6.654 5.892 5.000 6.009 5.186 
r-Stat. NA -1.192 -0.685 -0.666 -0.150 一 1 . 3 6 2 -0.921 
Infor. Ratio NA -0.077 -0.044 -0.043 -0.010 -0.088 -0.059 
Philippines 
Mean Ret. (%) 0.707* NA 0.190 0.203 0.442* -0.101 0.288 
Median Ret. (%) 0.854 NA -0.046 0.168 0.246 -0.194 0.159 
Std. Dev. (%) 4.752 NA 5.234 3.887 3.131 3.043 2.810 
/-Stat. 2.305 NA 0.562 0.808 2.186 -0.513 1.588 
Infor. Ratio 0.149 NA 0.036 0.052 0.141 -0.033 0.103 
South Africa 
Mean Ret. (%) 0.708 0.071 NA 0.214 0.433 -0.078 0.270 
Median Ret. (%) 0.853 0.047 NA 0.020 0.427 -0.231 0.168 
Std. Dev. (%) 5.931 5.180 NA 5.374 4.513 5.071 4.559 
r-Stat. 1.849 0.212 NA 0.618 1.485 -0.239 0.916 
Infor. Ratio 0.119 0.014 NA 0.040 0.096 -0.015 0.059 
South Korea 
Mean Ret. (%) 0.617 -0.055 0.078 NA 0.340 -0.191 0.158 
Median Ret. (%) 0.657 -0.168 -0.020 NA 0.246 -0.348 -0.016 
Std. Dev. (%) 5.528 3.992 5.620 NA 4.076 4.194 3.775 
r-Stat. 1.729 -0.213 0.215 NA 1.293 -0.704 0.648 
Infor. Ratio 0.112 -0.014 0.014 NA 0.083 -0.045 0.042 
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Table 2 一 continued 
Descriptive Statistics (Interest-Adjusted Currency Returns) 
Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand Equal 
Sri Lanka 
Mean Ret. (%) 0.283 -0.351 -0.243 -0.200 NA -0.483* —0.199 
Median Ret. (%) 0.382 -0.246 -0.427 -0.246 NA -0.500 -0.068 
Std. Dev. (%) 4.125 3.058 4.411 3.581 NA 3.416 2.224 
r-Stat. 1.062 -1.780 —0.854 -0.864 NA -2.189 -1.385 
Infor. Ratio 0.069 -0.115 -0.055 -0.056 NA -0.141 一 0 . 0 8 9 
Thailand 
Mean Ret. (%) 0.878** 0.183 0.322 0.350 0.594** NA 0.466* 
Median Ret. (%) 0.944 0.201 0.234 0.350 0.502 NA 0.488 
Std. Dev. (%) 5.196 2.908 4.898 3.985 3.373 NA 2.965 
/-Stat. 2.617 0.975 1.019 1.362 2.729 NA 2.432 
Infor. Ratio 0.169 0.063 0.066 0.088 0.176 NA 0.157 
This table exhibits the interest-adjusted monthly returns statistics of individual currencies 
over the period January 1985 to December 2004. Coverage of this period is 240 months. 
Each base currency is indicated on the first column and the succeeding columns give the 
return statistics of the five non-domestic currencies relative to the base currency. The Equal 
column computes currency returns by assuming same weight is allocated to each of the five 




Definition of Strategies 
Stratesv Moving Average Rule Range Long/Short 
One [1,2] - [12,36] Long Rank 1 
Short Rank 5 
(354 equally weighted MA combinations) (for each MA combination) 
Two [1,2] - [12,36] Long Rank 1 
Long Rank 2 
(354 equally weighted MA combinations) (equal weight to top 2 ranks) 
Short Rank 5 
(for each MA combination) 
Three [1,2] - [12,36] Long Rank 1 
Long Rank 2 
(354 equally weighted MA combinations) Long Rank 3 
(equal weight to top 3 ranks) 
Short Rank 5 
(for each MA combination) 
At the end of each month during January 1985 to December 2004，each currency is ranked 
from 1 to 5 based on the moving average difference, which is computed by short-run moving 
average minus long-run moving average. Each moving average combination contributes one 
portfolio and ultimately there are 354 different portfolios. Returns to each of the moving 
average portfolio are given same weight, generating monthly returns for strategies 1 to 3. 
The notation [1,2] in the above table refers to a ranking of individual currencies based on the 
difference between a short-run moving average of one month and a long-run moving average 
of two months. The notation [1,2]-[12,36] means that all of the 354 short-run/long-run 
moving average combinations are considered, where the short-run moving average are from 
one to 12 months and the long-run moving average are from one plus the short-run moving 
average to 36 months. 
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Table 4a 
Performance of Long/Short Strategy One (January 1985-December 2004) 
Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
Strategy One 
Mean Ret. (%) 3.443** 3.674** 2.934** 3.650** 3.905** 3.730** 
Median Ret. (%) 2.527 2.300 1.984 2.530 2.579 2.547 
Std. Dev. (%) 4.783 5.389 4.470 4.740 5.147 5.137 
Infor. Ratio 0.720 0.682 0.656 0.770 0.759 0.726 
Interest Diff (%) 一 0 . 0 4 6 -0.235 -0.319 -0.221 -0.201 -0.284 
Prob > 0 (%) 84.583 88.333 86.250 86.250 87.500 86.667 
Prob > Equal (%) 84.167 78.333 72.083 80.000 82.917 80.833 
Paired r-test 8.052** 9.103** 6.172** 8.840** 10.336** 8.357** 
Prop > 0 (%) 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 
Prop > Equal (%) 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 
For Tables 4a to 4c, each currency is regarded as base currency one by one and is indicated 
at the top of each column. The mean monthly return is indicated with an asterisk if it is 
different from zero significantly. The interest rate differential represents the return from the 
interest rate differential between non-domestic and domestic currency. The [Prob >] rows 
detail the percentage of the total 240 months that each strategy exceeded zero and 
outperformed the Equal benchmark. The paired Mest is used to test the significance of the 
excess returns of each strategy compared with the Equal benchmark. The [Prop >] rows 
detail the percentage of the 354 individual moving average rule for each strategy that 
exceeded zero and outperformed the Equal benchmark average return. ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4b 
Performance of Long/Short Strategy Two (January 1985-December 2004) 
Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
Strategy Two 
Mean Ret. (%) 2.874** 3.093** 2.473** 2.983** 3.245** 3.138** 
Median Ret. (%) 1.894 1.758 1.653 2.187 2.239 2.112 
Std. Dev. (%) 4.105 4.910 4.267 4.346 4.692 4.761 
Infor. Ratio 0.700 0.630 0.580 0.686 0.692 0.659 
Interest Diff(%) -0.072 -0.492 -0.554 -0.485 -0.480 -0.485 
Prob > 0 (%) 85.000 87.500 85.833 85.833 85.833 85.000 
Prob > Equal (%) 84.167 75.833 67.083 78.333 79.583 77.083 
paired Mest 7.152** 7.790** 5.127** 7.337** 9.048** 7.050** 
Prop > 0 (%) 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 
Prop > Equal (%) 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 
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Table 4c 
Performance of Long/Short Strategy Three (January 1985-December 2004) 
Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
Strategy Three 
Mean Ret. (%) 2.569** 2.710** 2.202** 2.635** 2.846** 2.773** 
Median Ret. (%) 1.583 1.439 1.291 1.818 1.738 1.790 
Std. Dev. (%) 3.855 4.786 4.166 4.281 4.519 4.695 
Infor. Ratio 0.666 0.566 0.529 0.616 0.630 0.591 
Interest Diff(%) -0.087 -0.604 -0.658 -0.579 -0.625 -0.552 
Prob > 0 (%) 87.083 87.500 83.750 84.167 84.583 84.583 
Prob > Equal (%) 82.083 70.417 65.833 73.333 77.917 70.417 
paired r-test 6.617** 6.764** 4.531** 6.448** 8.179** 6.094** 
Prop > 0 (%) 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 




Individual Rank Analysis for 
Strategies One, Two and Three (Jan 1985-Dec 2004) 
Rank 
1 2 3 4 5 
Mexico 
Mean Ret. (%) 1.300** 0.163 —0.189 -0.673 -2.143** 
Median Ret. (%) 0.382 -0.411 -0.547 -0.829 —1.729 
Std. Dev. (%) 5.752 5.109 5.265 5.304 6.176 
Infor. Ratio 0.226 0.032 -0.036 -0.127 -0.347 
Interest Diff(%) -1.804 —1.856 -1.877 -1.889 -1.758 
Philippines 
Mean Ret. (%) 2.021** 0.860** 0.287 -0.074 -1.653** 
Median Ret. (%) 1.568 0.604 0.065 -0.180 -1.157 
Std. Dev. (%) 4.175 2.866 2.893 3.115 4.681 
Infor. Ratio 0.484 0.300 0.099 -0.024 —0.353 
Interest Diff(%) 0.623 0.108 0.030 0.162 0.858 
South Africa 
Mean Ret. (%) 1.656** 0.733* 0.377 -0.140 -1.279** 
Median Ret. (%) 1.440 0.572 0.197 -0.138 —0.840 
Std. Dev. (%) 4.892 4.460 4.536 4.769 5.929 
Infor. Ratio 0.338 0.164 0.083 -0.029 -0.216 
Interest Diff (%) 0.529 0.060 -0.021 0.020 0.848 
South Korea 
Mean Ret. (%) 1.974** 0.639* 0.259 -0.406 -1.676** 
Median Ret. (%) 1.417 0.252 0.112 -0.435 -0.932 
Std. Dev. (%) 4.638 3.868 3.906 3.802 5.241 
Infor. Ratio 0.426 0.165 0.066 -0.107 -0.320 
Interest Diff (%) 0.875 0.347 0.330 0.413 1.096 
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Table 5 一 continued 
Individual Rank Analysis for 
Strategies One, Two and Three (Jan 1985-Dec 2004) 
Rank 
丄 2 3 4 5 
Sri Lanka 
Mean Ret. (%) 1.727** 0.407** —0.137 -0.813** -2.178** 
Median Ret. (%) 1.082 0.369 -0.138 -0.580 -1.398 
Std. Dev. (%) 3.230 2.034 2.207 2.477 4.810 
Infor. Ratio 0.535 0.200 -0.062 -0.328 -0.453 
Interest Diff (%) 0.057 -0.500 —0.656 -0.595 0.259 
Thailand 
Mean Ret. (%) 2.227** 1.042** 0.537** 0.023 -1.503** 
Median Ret. (%) 1.576 0.778 0.410 0.116 -0.615 
Std. Dev. (%) 3.965 3.047 3.050 2.980 4.993 
Infor. Ratio 0.562 0.342 0.176 0.008 -0.301 
Interest Diff (%) 1.033 0.629 0.630 0.734 1.316 
At the end of each month during January 1985 to December 2004，each currency is ranked 
from 1 to 5 based on the moving average difference, which is computed by short-run moving 
average of prior returns minus long-run moving average of prior returns. All combination 
ranging from [1,2] to [12,36] will be considered. Each moving average combination 
contributes one portfolio and ultimately there are 354 different portfolios. Returns to each of 
the moving average portfolio are given same weight, generating monthly returns for ranks 1 
to 5. Each base currency is indicated on the first column. The mean monthly return to each 
rank is indicated with an asterisk if it is different from zero significantly. The information 
ratio is the mean return divided by the standard deviation. The interest differential is the 
return due to the interest rate differential between non-domestic and domestic currency. ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
41 
Table 6c 
Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis for the Entire Sample Period (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Range Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
1985-1989 
(1—12) 3.428** 3.602** 2.096** 3.620** 3.578** 3.632** 
(1-3) 4.698** 5.157** 3.070** 5.370** 5.288** 5.296** 
(4-6) 3.453** 3.738** 2.192** 3.673** 3.641** 3.744** 
(7—9) 2.748** 2.782** 1.601** 2.729** 2.682** 2.760** 
(10-12) 2.419** 2.223** 1.201* 2.159** 2.166** 2.196** 
Equal -0.562 0.172 0.505 -0.098 0.533* 0.264 
1990-1994 
(1-12) 2.179** 2.162** 2.530** 2.888** 2.940** 2.874** 
(1—3) 2.860** 2.519** 3.112** 3.530** 3.611** 3.541** 
(4—6) 2.189** 2.210** 2.562** 2.908** 2.952** 2.889** 
(7-9) 1.814** 2.010** 2.272** 2.592** 2.633** 2.566** 
(10-12) 1.642** 1.786** 1.981** 2.315** 2.351** 2.287** 
Equal 0.441 -0.117 0.418 0.087 -0.634** 0.234 
1995-1999 
(1-12) 4.105** 4.594** 4.330** 3.779** 4.724** 3.909** 
(1-3) 5.658** 7.099** 6.680** 6.005** 7.241** 6.494** 
(4-6) 4.219** 4.589** 4.573** 3.845** 4.923** 3.758** 
(7-9) 3.270** 3.162** 2.952** 2.490** 3.262** 2.510* 
(10-12) 2.780** 2.787** 2.366* 2.104* 2.679** 2.136* 
Equal -1 .027 0.648 0.590 0.649 -0 .666 0.832 
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Table 6c 一 continued 
Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis for the Entire Sample Period (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Range Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
2000-2004 
(1-12) 4.060** 4.338** 2.781** 4.313** 4.379** 4.505** 
(1-3) 5.291** 5.569** 3.626** 5.561** 5.575** 5.780** 
(4-6) 4.031** 4.305** 2.885** 4.301** 4.432** 4.503** 
(7-9) 3.484** 3.734** 2.376** 3.712** 3.766** 3.905** 
(10—12) 3.057** 3.369** 1.948** 3.289** 3.360** 3.432** 
Equal -0.086 0.450 -0.435 -0.007 -0.029 0.532* 
1985-2004 
(1-12) 3.443** 3.674** 2.934** 3.650** 3.905** 3.730** 
(1-3) 4.627** 5.086** 4.122** 5.116** 5.429** 5.278** 
(4-6) 3.473** 3.711** 3.053** 3.682** 3.987** 3.724** 
(7-9) 2.829** 2.922** 2.300** 2.881** 3.086** 2.935** 
(10-12) 2.475** 2.541** 1.874** 2.467** 2.639** 2.513** 
Equal -0.308 0.288 0.270 0.158 -0.199 0.466* 
Table 6a details the mean monthly returns (in percentage) to strategy one. The short-run 
moving averages used for a given test are specified in the first column and the associated 
long-run moving averages range from 1+ the short-run moving average parameter value up 
to 36. For instance, if the short-run moving average range is (1-3), then all of the 
short-run/long-run moving average strategies from [1, 2] to [3，36] will be evaluated and the 
resulting performance is averaged. The Equal row presents the Equal-weighted 
interest-adjusted currency returns during respective sample period for each base currency. 
The mean monthly returns are marked with an asterisk if they are different from zero 
significantly. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6c 
Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis for the Entire Sample Period (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Range Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
1985-1989 
(1-12) 2.703** 2.833** 1.648** 2.730** 2.814** 2.845** 
(1-3) 3.700** 4.024** 2.404** 4.100** 4.108** 4.166** 
(4-6) 2.679** 2.979** 1.724** 2.780** 2.879** 2.961** 
(7-9) 2.226** 2.226** 1.275** 2.084** 2.159** 2.179** 
(10-12) 1.912** 1.713* 0.942 1.531* 1.709* 1.650* 
Equal -0.562 0.172 0.505 -0.098 0.533* 0.264 
1990-1994 
(1-12) 1.882** 2.020** 2.226** 2.596** 2.576** 2.581** 
(1-3) 2.441** 2.325** 2.712** 3.124** 3.159** 3.145** 
(4—6) 1.874** 2.077** 2.253** 2.620** 2.582** 2.597** 
(7-9) 1.607** 1.874** 1.993** 2.333** 2.290** 2.298** 
(10-12) 1.440** 1.697** 1.792** 2.141** 2.095** 2.112** 
Equal 0.441 -0.117 0.418 0.087 -0.634** 0.234 
1995-1999 
(1-12) 3.619** 3.986** 3.667** 3.268** 4.061** 3.419** 
(1-3) 5.009** 5.995** 5.552** 5.005** 6.124** 5.400** 
(4-6) 3.721** 4.029** 3.914** 3.351** 4.293** 3.450** 
(7-9) 2.815** 2.866** 2.527** 2.292** 2.813** 2.339* 
(10-12) 2.500** 2.456* 2.075* 1.896* 2.364* 1.898 
Equal -1 .027 0.648 0.590 0.649 -0 .666 0.832 
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Table 6c 一 continued 
Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis for the Entire Sample Period (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Range Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
2000-2004 
(1-12) 3.294** 3.533** 2.352** 3.337** 3.530** 3.705** 
(1-3) 4.349** 4.558** 3.128** 4.421** 4.609** 4.756** 
(4-6) 3.363** 3.579** 2.414** 3.341** 3.615** 3.755** 
(7-9) 2.775** 3.052** 1.985** 2.813** 2.989** 3.241** 
(10-12) 2.356** 2.623** 1.631** 2.445** 2.565** 2.732** 
Equal —0.086 0.450 -0.435 -0.007 -0.029 0.532* 
1985-2004 
(1-12) 2.874** 3.093** 2.473** 2.983** 3.245** 3.138** 
(1-3) 3.875** 4.226** 3.449** 4.162** 4.500** 4.367** 
(4-6) 2.909** 3.166** 2.576** 3.023** 3.342** 3.191** 
(7-9) 2.356** 2.505** 1.945** 2.380** 2.563** 2.514** 
(10-12) 2.052** 2.122** 1.610** 2.003** 2.183** 2.098** 
Equal -0.308 0.288 0.270 0.158 -0.199 0.466* 
Table 6b details the mean monthly returns (in percentage) to strategy two. The short-run 
moving averages used for a given test are specified in the first column and the associated 
long-run moving averages range from 1+ the short-run moving average parameter value up 
to 36. For instance, if the short-run moving average range is (1-3), then all of the 
short-run/long-run moving average strategies from [1, 2] to [3, 36] will be evaluated and the 
resulting performance is averaged. The Equal row presents the Equal-weighted 
interest-adjusted currency returns during respective sample period for each base currency. 
The mean monthly returns are marked with an asterisk if they are different from zero 
significantly. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6c 
Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis for the Entire Sample Period (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Range Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
1985-1989 
(1-12) 2.404** 2.364** 1.343** 2.329** 2.381** 2.432** 
(1-3) 3.264** 3.444** 2.051** 3.526** 3.532** 3.598** 
(4-6) 2.335** 2.462** 1.375** 2.338** 2.420** 2.501** 
(7-9) 1.985** 1.825** 0.995* 1.750** 1.820** 1.873** 
(10-12) 1.782** 1.368* 0.725 1.331 1.386* 1.377* 
Equal -0.562 0.172 0.505 -0.098 0.533* 0.264 
1990-1994 
(1—12) 1.680** 1.857** 2.019** 2.420** 2.347** 2.411** 
(1-3) 2.164** 2.135** 2.489** 2.893** 2.860** 2.925** 
(4-6) 1.690** 1.896** 2.034** 2.432** 2.360** 2.431** 
(7-9) 1.457** 1.731** 1.793** 2.189** 2.110** 2.158** 
(10-12) 1.254** 1.570* 1.614** 2.019** 1.895** 1.965** 
Equal 0.441 -0.117 0.418 0.087 -0.634** 0.234 
1995-1999 
(1-12) 3.330** 3.627** 3.344** 2.883** 3.667** 3.073** 
(1—3) 4.462** 5.352** 4.894** 4.342** 5.377** 4.835** 
(4-6) 3.427** 3.689** 3.517** 2.946** 3.868** 3.103** 
(7-9) 2.689** 2.619** 2.414** 2.050* 2.632** 2.115* 
(10-12) 2.381** 2.324* 2.053* 1.746* 2.242* 1.703 
Equal -1 .027 0.648 0.590 0.649 -0 .666 0.832 
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Table 6c 一 continued 
Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis for the Entire Sample Period (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Range Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
2000-2004 
(1-12) 2.863** 2.993** 2.101** 2.908** 2.988** 3.178** 
(1—3) 3.792** 3.933** 2.762** 3.845** 3.969** 4.140** 
(4-6) 2.924** 3.058** 2.229** 2.950** 3.081** 3.226** 
(7-9) 2.392** 2.520** 1.757** 2.452** 2.477** 2.735** 
(10-12) 2.042** 2.154** 1.424** 2.081** 2.103** 2.297** 
Equal -0.086 0.450 -0.435 -0.007 -0.029 0.532* 
1985-2004 
(1-12) 2.569** 2.710** 2.202** 2.635** 2.846** 2.773** 
(1-3) 3.420** 3.716** 3.049** 3.652** 3.934** 3.875** 
(4-6) 2.594** 2.776** 2.289** 2.666** 2.932** 2.815** 
(7-9) 2.131** 2.174** 1.740** 2.110** 2.260** 2.220** 
(10-12) 1.865** 1.854** 1.454** 1.794** 1.906** 1.835** 
Equal -0.308 0.288 0.270 0.158 -0.199 0.466* 
Table 6c details the mean monthly returns (in percentage) to strategy three. The short-run 
moving averages used for a given test are specified in the first column and the associated 
long-run moving averages range from 1+ the short-run moving average parameter value up 
to 36. For instance, if the short-run moving average range is (1-3), then all of the 
short-run/long-run moving average strategies from [1’ 2] to [3，36] will be evaluated and the 
resulting performance is averaged. The Equal row presents the Equal-weighted 
interest-adjusted currency returns during respective sample period for each base currency. 
The mean monthly returns are marked with an asterisk if they are different from zero 
significantly. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7c 一 continued 
Event-Based Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis: 
Mexican Peso Crisis (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Range Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
5-year Subsample Before Mexican Peso Crisis: December 1989 - November 1994 
(1-12) 2.255** 1.605** 2.004** 2.376** 2.435** 2.361** 
(1-3) 2.884** 1.993** 2.571** 3.036** 3.103** 3.038** 
(4-6) 2.287** 1.658** 2.051** 2.400** 2.454** 2.389** 
(7-9) 1.916** 1.434** 1.750** 2.068** 2.125** 2.044** 
(10-12) 1.737** 1.202** 1.453** 1.788** 1.841** 1.756** 
Equal -0.458* -0.002 0.489 0.257* -0.523** 0.355** 
5-year Subsample Since Mexican Peso Crisis Outbreak: December 1994 一 November 1999 
(1-12) 4.042** 5.144** 4.831** 4.269** 5.255** 4.425** 
(1-3) 5.636** 7.630** 7.183** 6.503** 7.756** 7.034** 
(4-6) 4.149** 5.143** 5.070** 4.316** 5.458** 4.267** 
(7-9) 3.185** 3.721** 3.455** 2.977** 3.802** 3.016* 
(10-12) 2.695** 3.345** 2.867* 2.611* 3.219** 2.642* 
Equal -0.177 0.575 0.454 0.522 -0.810* 0.769 
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Table 7c 一 continued 
Event-Based Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis: 
Mexican Peso Crisis (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Range Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
Entire Sample Period: January 1985 一 December 2004 
(1-12) 3.443** 3.674** 2.934** 3.650** 3.905** 3.730** 
(1-3) 4.627** 5.086** 4.122** 5.116** 5.429** 5.278** 
(4-6) 3.473** 3.711** 3.053** 3.682** 3.987** 3.724** 
(7-9) 2.829** 2.922** 2.300** 2.881** 3.086** 2.935** 
(10-12) 2.475** 2.541** 1.874** 2.467** 2.639** 2.513** 
Equal -0.308 0.288 0.270 0.158 -0.199 0.466* 
Tables 7a to 7c report the results of strategies 1 to 3 respectively before and after the 
Mexican Peso Crisis, which broke out in December 1994. The short-run moving averages 
used for a given test are specified in the first column and the associated long-run moving 
averages range from 1+ the short-run moving average parameter value up to 36. For instance, 
if the short-run moving average range is (1-3), then all of the short-run/long-run moving 
average strategies from [1，2] to [3，36] will be evaluated and the resulting performance is 
averaged. The Equal row presents the Equal-weighted interest-adjusted currency returns 
during respective sample period for each base currency. The mean monthly returns are 
marked with an asterisk if they are different from zero significantly. ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7c 一 continued 
Event-Based Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis: 
Mexican Peso Crisis (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Range Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
5-year Subsample Before Mexican Peso Crisis: December 1989 一 November 1994 
(1-12) 1.910** 1.462** 1.672** 2.074** 2.057** 2.056** 
(1-3) 2.446** 1.778** 2.169** 2.615** 2.626** 2.618** 
(4-6) 1.923** 1.524** 1.707** 2.097** 2.069** 2.082** 
(7-9) 1.644** 1.309** 1.432** 1.804** 1.777** 1.771** 
(10-12) 1.465** 1.128** 1.224** 1.613** 1.582** 1.579** 
Equal -0.458* -0.002 0.489 0.257* -0.523** 0.355** 
5-year Subsample Since Mexican Peso Crisis Outbreak: December 1994 - November 1999 
(1-12) 3.568** 4.540** 4.188** 3.788** 4.611** 3.964** 
(1-3) 4.999** 6.542** 6.069** 5.520** 6.658** 5.949** 
(4-6) 3.660** 4.577** 4.428** 3.871** 4.837** 3.992** 
(7-9) 2.745** 3.424** 3.050** 2.814** 3.373** 2.883* 
(10-12) 2.431** 3.021* 2.605* 2.419* 2.933** 2.443* 
Equal -0.177 0.575 0.454 0.522 -0.810* 0.769 
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Table 7c 一 continued 
Event-Based Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis: 
Mexican Peso Crisis (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Range Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
Entire Sample Period: January 1985 一 December 2004 
(1-12) 2.874** 3.093** 2.473** 2.983** 3.245** 3.138** 
(1-3) 3.875** 4.226** 3.449** 4.162** 4.500** 4.367** 
(4-6) 2.909** 3.166** 2.576** 3.023** 3.342** 3.191** 
(7-9) 2.356** 2.505** 1.945** 2.380** 2.563** 2.514** 
(10-12) 2.052** 2.122** 1.610** 2.003** 2.183** 2.098** 
Equal -0.308 0.288 0.270 0.158 -0.199 0.466* 
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Table 7c 一 continued 
Event-Based Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis: 
Mexican Peso Crisis (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Range Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
5-year Subsample Before Mexican Peso Crisis: December 1989 - November 1994 
(1-12) 1.689** 1.293** 1.460** 1.884** 1.808** 1.863** 
(1-3) 2.168** 1.583** 1.945** 2.375** 2.320** 2.393** 
(4-6) 1.712** 1.337** 1.480** 1.894** 1.824** 1.888** 
(7-9) 1.466** 1.160** 1.224** 1.644** 1.572** 1.601** 
(10-12) 1.257** 0.992** 1.039** 1.470** 1.354** 1.403** 
Equal -0.458* -0.002 0.489 0.257* -0.523** 0.355** 
5-year Subsample Since Mexican Peso Crisis Outbreak: December 1994 一 November 1999 
(1-12) 3.298** 4.183** 3.873** 3.411** 4.230** 3.626** 
(1—3) 4.450** 5.905** 5.418** 4.866** 5.917** 5.384** 
(4-6) 3.390** 4.245** 4.050** 3.476** 4.436** 3.659** 
(7-9) 2.647** 3.177** 2.945** 2.580** 3.205** 2.670* 
(10-12) 2.338** 2.884* 2.583* 2.275* 2.816* 2.257 
Equal -0.177 0.575 0.454 0.522 -0.810* 0.769 
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Table 7c 一 continued 
Event-Based Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis: 
Mexican Peso Crisis (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Range Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
Entire Sample Period: January 1985 一 December 2004 
(1-12) 2.569** 2.710** 2.202** 2.635** 2.846** 2.773** 
(1-3) 3.420** 3.716** 3.049** 3.652** 3.934** 3.875** 
(4-6) 2.594** 2.776** 2.289** 2.666** 2.932** 2.815** 
(7—9) 2.131** 2.174** 1.740** 2.110** 2.260** 2.220** 
(10-12) 1.865** 1.854** 1.454** 1.794** 1.906** 1.835** 
Equal -0.308 0.288 0.270 0.158 -0.199 0.466* 
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Table 8c 一 continued 
Event-Based Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis: 
Asian Financial Crisis (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Range Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
5-year Subsample Before Asian Financial Crisis: July 1992 一 June 1997 
(1-12) 1.870** 2.617** 2.555** 2.922** 3.112** 3.028** 
(1-3) 2.661** 3.888** 3.941** 4.346** 4.614** 4.491** 
(4-6) 1.837** 2.563** 2.598** 2.914** 3.141** 3.048** 
(7-9) 1.458** 1.980* 1.843* 2.166** 2.335** 2.268** 
(10-12) 1.293** 1.662* 1.405 1.832* 1.895* 1.855* 
Equal 0.362 -0.137 0.853* 0.114 -0.948** 0.318 
5-year Subsample Since Asian Financial Crisis Outbreak: July 1997 一 June 2002 
(1-12) 5.348** 5.680** 5.286** 4.967** 5.771** 5.116** 
(1-3) 7.156** 7.649** 7.136** 6.711** 7.667** 7.209** 
(4—6) 5.480** 5.722** 5.592** 5.028** 6.004** 4.940** 
(7-9) 4.432** 4.554** 4.224** 3.998** 4.667** 4.042** 
(10-12) 3.744** 4.200** 3.568** 3.594** 4.130** 3.680** 
Equal -1.064* 0.498 0.831 0.339 —0.346 0.823 
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Table 8c 一 continued 
Event-Based Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis: 
Asian Financial Crisis (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Range Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
Entire Sample Period: January 1985 - December 2004 
(1-12) 3.443** 3.674** 2.934** 3.650** 3.905** 3.730** 
(1-3) 4.627** 5.086** 4.122** 5.116** 5.429** 5.278** 
(4-6) 3.473** 3.711** 3.053** 3.682** 3.987** 3.724** 
(7-9) 2.829** 2.922** 2.300** 2.881** 3.086** 2.935** 
(10-12) 2.475** 2.541** 1.874** 2.467** 2.639** 2.513** 
Equal -0.308 0.288 0.270 0.158 -0.199 0.466* 
Tables 8a to 8c report the results of strategies 1 to 3 respectively before and after the Asian 
Financial Crisis, which broke out in July 1997. The short-run moving averages used for a 
given test are specified in the first column and the associated long-run moving averages 
range from 1+ the short-run moving average parameter value up to 36. For instance, if the 
short-run moving average range is (1-3), then all of the short-run/long-run moving average 
strategies from [1, 2] to [3’ 36] will be evaluated and the resulting performance is averaged. 
The Equal row presents the Equal-weighted interest-adjusted currency returns during 
respective sample period for each base currency. The mean monthly returns are marked with 
an asterisk if they are different from zero significantly. ** and * indicate significance at the 
1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8c 一 continued 
Event-Based Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis: 
Asian Financial Crisis (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Range Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
5-year Subsample Before Asian Financial Crisis: July 1992 一 June 1997 
(1-12) 1.595** 2.300** 2.082** 2.470** 2.598** 2.581** 
(1-3) 2.264** 3.338** 3.205** 3.616** 3.840** 3.766** 
(4-6) 1.539** 2.298** 2.168** 2.501** 2.673** 2.644** 
(7-9) 1.256** 1.765* 1.474 1.838* 1.918* 1.939* 
(10-12) 1.136** 1.493 1.128 1.583 1.578 1.609* 
Equal 0.362 -0.137 0.853* 0.114 -0.948** 0.318 
5-year Subsample Since Asian Financial Crisis Outbreak: July 1997 一 June 2002 
(1-12) 4.711** 5.029** 4.574** 4.328** 5.069** 4.581** 
(1-3) 6.286** 6.590** 6.131** 5.711** 6.679** 6.150** 
(4-6) 4.911** 5.113** 4.806** 4.374** 5.312** 4.577** 
(7-9) 3.841** 4.204** 3.675** 3.609** 4.118** 3.823** 
(10-12) 3.297** 3.726** 3.176** 3.196** 3.644** 3.301** 
Equal -1.064* 0.498 0.831 0.339 -0.346 0.823 
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Table 8c 一 continued 
Event-Based Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis: 
Asian Financial Crisis (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Ranee Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
Entire Sample Period: January 1985 - December 2004 
(1-12) 2.874** 3.093** 2.473** 2.983** 3.245** 3.138** 
(1-3) 3.875** 4.226** 3.449** 4.162** 4.500** 4.367** 
(4-6) 2.909** 3.166** 2.576** 3.023** 3.342** 3.191** 
(7-9) 2.356** 2.505** 1.945** 2.380** 2.563** 2.514** 
(10-12) 2.052** 2.122** 1.610** 2.003** 2.183** 2.098** 
Equal -0.308 0.288 0.270 0.158 -0.199 0.466* 
57 
Table 8c 一 continued 
Event-Based Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis: 
Asian Financial Crisis (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Range Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
5-year Subsample Before Asian Financial Crisis: July 1992 - June 1997 
(1-12) 1.457** 2.128** 1.884** 2.261** 2.326** 2.376** 
(1-3) 2.052** 3.073** 2.882** 3.263** 3.440** 3.435** 
(4-6) 1.417** 2.114** 1.947** 2.280** 2.416** 2.453** 
(7-9) 1.154** 1.627* 1.327 1.701* 1.712* 1.790* 
(10-12) 1.034** 1.418 1.069 1.498 1.383 1.491 
Equal 0.362 -0.137 0.853* 0.114 -0.948** 0.318 
5-year Subsample Since Asian Financial Crisis Outbreak: July 1997-June 2002 
(1-12) 4.318** 4.526** 4.192** 3.877** 4.561** 4.111** 
(1-3) 5.563** 5.824** 5.433** 4.992** 5.852** 5.502** 
(4-6) 4.506** 4.654** 4.418** 3.931** 4.769** 4.098** 
(7-9) 3.645** 3.785** 3.484** 3.302** 3.801** 3.435** 
(10-12) 3.135** 3.420** 3.007** 2.926** 3.385** 2.981** 
Equal -1.064* 0.498 0.831 0.339 -0.346 0.823 
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Table 8c 一 continued 
Event-Based Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis: 
Asian Financial Crisis (Strategy Three) 
Short-Run 
MA Range Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
Entire Sample Period: January 1985 - December 2004 
(1-12) 2.569** 2.710** 2.202** 2.635** 2.846** 2.773** 
(1-3) 3.420** 3.716** 3.049** 3.652** 3.934** 3.875** 
(4-6) 2.594** 2.776** 2.289** 2.666** 2.932** 2.815** 
(7-9) 2.131** 2.174** 1.740** 2.110** 2.260** 2.220** 
(10-12) 1.865** 1.854** 1.454** 1.794** 1.906** 1.835** 
Equal -0.308 0.288 0.270 0.158 —0.199 0.466* 
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Table 9 
Currency-Based Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis: 
Performance of Long/Short Strategy Among Asian Currencies 
Philippines S.Korea Thailand 
5-year Subsample Before Asian Financial Crisis: July 1992 一 June 1997 
Mean Return (%) 0.422** 1.041** 1.008** 
Median Return (%) 0.355 0.330 0.729 
Std. Dev. (%) 0.710 1.758 1.667 
Information Ratio 0.595 0.592 0.605 
Interest Diff(%) 0.039 0.201 0.070 
Prob > 0 (%) 68.333 78.333 73.333 
Prob > Equal (%) 61.667 71.667 63.333 
paired Mest 2.109* 4.016** 2.705** 
5-year Subsample Since Asian Financial Crisis Outbreak: July 1997 一 June 2002 
Mean Return (%) 3.135** 1.851** 2.587** 
Median Return (%) 1.267 0.893 1.548 
Std. Dev. (%) 6.675 3.941 4.983 
Information Ratio 0.470 0.470 0.519 
Interest Diff(%) 0.020 0.037 -0.035 
Prob > 0 (%) 75.000 78.333 75.000 
Prob > Equal (%) 73.333 65.000 60.000 
paired r-test 3.095** 2.041* 1.928* 
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Table 9 一 continued 
Currency-Based Subsample and Sensitivity Analysis: 
Performance of Long/Short Strategy Among Asian Currencies 
Philippines S.Korea Thailand 
Entire Sample Period: January 1985 一 December 2004 
Mean Return (%) 1.237** 1.178** 1.407** 
Median Return (%) 0.567 0.449 0.664 
Std. Dev. (%) 3.580 2.567 3.049 
Information Ratio 0.346 0.459 0.462 
Interest Diff (%) 0.001 0.146 0.014 
Prob > 0 (%) 73.333 75.000 68.750 
Prob > Equal (%) 67.917 67.917 61.250 
paired f-test 4.146** 4.698** 3.751** 
In Table 9，only the three Asian currencies, the Philippine Peso, the Thai Baht and the South 
Korean Won are studied. Each of the three Asian currencies is regarded as base currency one 
by one and is indicated at the top of each column. The strategy is to Long the rank-l 
non-domestic currency and Short the rank-2 non-domestic currency for each base currency. 
The mean monthly return is indicated with an asterisk if it is different from zero significantly. 
The information ratio is the mean return divided by the standard deviation. The interest rate 
differential represents the return from the interest rate differential between non-domestic and 
domestic currency. The [Prob >] rows detail the percentage of the months that each strategy 
exceeded zero and outperformed the Equal benchmark. The paired r-test is used to test the 
significance of the excess returns of each strategy compared with the Equal benchmark. ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10a 
Autocorrelation Analysis (Strategy One) 
Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
Autocorrelations Returns 
1 0.144* 0.158* 0.221** 0.081 0.146* 0.033 
2 0.109 0.055 0.189** -0.004 0.075 -0.044 
3 0.140* -0.001 0.168** 0.015 0.047 0.032 
4 0.089 -0.059 0.071 -0.103 -0.033 -0.044 
5 0.158* 0.161* 0.201** 0.096 0.154* 0.039 
6 0.197** 0.152* 0.111 0.127 0.141* 0.033 
7 0.215** 0.159* 0.151* 0.123 0.173** 0.168* 
8 -0.086 -0.055 0.020 -0.054 -0.054 -0.046 
9 0.050 0.001 0.028 -0.039 -0.035 一 0.012 
10 -0.013 -0.031 0.049 -0.098 -0.066 -0.056 
Autocorrelations Squared Returns 
1 0.246** 0.110 0.126 0.083 0.130* 0.131* 
2 0.162* 0.041 0.142* —0.022 0.086 -0.032 
3 0.021 0.007 0.067 0.011 0.017 0.035 
4 0.039 -0.004 0.045 -0.036 0.008 0.002 
5 0.175** 0.164* 0.179** 0.109 0.163* 0.053 
6 0.259** 0.098 0.046 0.080 0.096 0.066 
7 0.252** 0.101 0.096 0.062 0.136* 0.083 
8 -0.027 -0.043 -0.027 -0.049 -0.046 -0.033 
9 -0.017 -0.030 -0.011 -0.047 -0.039 -0.040 
10 -0.034 -0.030 -0.005 -0.040 -0.042 -0.031 
Tables 10a to 10c show the autocorrelations of returns and squared returns for strategies 1 to 
3 respectively. The base currency is notated at the top of each column. ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10b 
Autocorrelation Analysis (Strategy Two) 
Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
Autocorrelations Returns 
1 0.192** 0.170** 0.200** 0.073 0.157* 0.026 
2 0.104 0.038 0.165* -0.026 0.066 -0.019 
3 0.175** 0.041 0.167* 0.078 0.082 0.047 
4 0.091 -0.082 0.032 -0.131* -0.051 -0.082 
5 0.139* 0.151* 0.163* 0.079 0.138* 0.027 
6 0.228** 0.137* 0.082 0.119 0.138* 0.023 
7 0.158* 0.088 0.100 0.053 0.116 0.118 
8 -0.094 -0.046 0.016 -0.047 -0.039 -0.037 
9 0.075 0.020 0.044 0.011 -0.008 0.024 
10 0.014 0.010 0.057 -0.042 -0.028 -0.012 
Autocorrelations Squared Returns 
1 0.254** 0.111 0.114 0.073 0.120 0.127* 
2 0.120 0.009 0.061 -0.034 0.030 -0.020 
3 0.039 0.025 0.071 0.046 0.038 0.056 
4 0.052 0.019 0.061 0.014 0.037 0.020 
5 0.202** 0.138* 0.138* 0.071 0.121 0.025 
6 0.238** 0.064 0.028 0.042 0.057 0.035 
7 0.142* 0.032 0.027 -0.004 0.047 0.025 
8 -0.042 -0.042 -0.029 -0.051 -0.048 -0.038 
9 -0.002 -0.027 -0.013 -0.027 -0.029 -0.026 
10 -0.015 一 0 . 0 1 2 0.001 -0.008 -0.017 -0.012 
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Table 10c 
Autocorrelation Analysis (Strategy Three) 
Mexico Philippines S.Africa S.Korea Sri Lanka Thailand 
Autocorrelations Returns 
1 0.212** 0.170** 0.186** 0.068 0.153* 0.017 
2 0.106 0.031 0.169** -0.039 0.070 -0.009 
3 0.175** 0.036 0.157* 0.092 0.094 0.043 
4 0.095 -0.095 0.013 -0.142* -0.059 -0.107 
5 0.123 0.142* 0.154* 0.060 0.130* 0.023 
6 0.227** 0.127 0.076 0.099 0.117 0.009 
7 0.144* 0.068 0.099 0.022 0.102 0.092 
8 -0.092 -0.053 0.018 -0.048 -0.039 -0.050 
9 0.060 0.020 0.052 0.026 0.003 0.039 
10 0.024 0.021 0.068 -0.032 -0.008 -0.002 
Autocorrelations Squared Returns 
1 0.297** 0.112 0.111 0.078 0.122 0.132* 
2 0.156* 0.002 0.066 -0.035 0.039 -0.016 
3 0.046 0.034 0.081 0.053 0.050 0.065 
4 0.068 0.035 0.079 0.033 0.059 0.030 
5 0.210** 0.134* 0.111 0.056 0.096 0.020 
6 0.247** 0.059 0.024 0.028 0.039 0.028 
7 0.135* 0.015 0.030 -0.014 0.039 0.008 
8 -0.046 -0.039 -0.030 -0.049 -0.048 -0.037 
9 -0.007 -0.026 -0.014 -0.024 -0.027 -0.022 
10 —0.014 -0.009 0.005 -0.002 -0.009 -0.010 
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